The exercise by an Australian state agency of coercive powers against construction industry workers has been justified by reference to claimed gains in productivity and hence national welfare. Yet the literature suggests that a more cooperative approach to union-management relations would offer better opportunities for productivity improvement. This article examines the data behind the productivity claims and finds that they were erroneous, probably due to incorrect transcription, and that the source data indicated no relative productivity gains against the identified benchmark. Despite being made aware of this, the state agency and its consultant maintained the original claims about the size of productivity and welfare gains from the use of coercive powers.
Introduction
The Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC) was established by the Howard government under special legislation enabling the use of coercive powers to regulate union activity. The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act (2005) (BCII Act) provided for six months jail for people refusing to cooperate with ABCC inquiries (section 52). Only the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), responsible for ensuring national security, has similar coercive powers regarding the questioning of persons who assist in relation to a terrorism offence. The ABCC, by contrast, could apply these ASIO-style powers to investigate an employee's breach of an award. Unlike hearings by public tribunals, such as Fair Work Australia, the ABCC conducted its interrogations in secret. Detailing the nature and implications of the extraordinary coercive powers of the ABCC is beyond the scope of this paper, but they have been extensively analysed elsewhere (Williams and McGarrity 2008) . At the time of writing, the legislation was still in place but with proposed amendments before the Senate, after an inquiry by Hon Murray Wilcox QC (Wilcox 2008 (Wilcox , 2009 ). The Labor government's Building and Construction Industry Improvement Amendment (Fair Work) Bill proposed to abolish the ABCC but transfer most of its coercive powers to a new Fair Work -Building Industry Inspectorate, albeit with a some additional, limited safeguards (Gillard 2009 ).
Arguments to retain the use of state coercive powers in the industry were based on data suggesting economic welfare benefits from maintaining a separate regulatory regime in the industry. In 2007, the ABCC released a report by private consultants, Econtech (2007a) , which claimed that the BCII Act had resulted in major improvements in labour productivity.
That report remained the basis on which claims about industry productivity gains were made (eg Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2009). This article aims to assess the merits of the data on which this debate was cast from 2007, and its implications for the interpretation of commissioned modelling and the future of regulation of the building and construction industry.
Productivity and construction unions
The 2007 report followed an earlier report by Econtech (2003) , that had been undertaken for the then Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR). That earlier report compared average costs in the domestic and commercial construction sectors and claimed to show that 'building tasks such as laying a concrete slab, building a brick wall, painting and carpentry work cost an average of 10% more for commercial buildings than domestic residential housing' (Econtech 2007a, i; Econtech 2003) . The claim was based on analysis of data from Rawlinson's, a quantity surveyor that collects and publishes data annually on such costs, by contacting firms and contractors and asking them the price of a specific task. The comparison was made between costs in the largely non-union domestic (housing) construction sector, and the more unionised commercial construction sector. The logic was that costs would be higher in the commercial sector because of its union presence, so the 10% cost difference reflected the union impact in creating inefficient work practices and reducing productivity.
This methodology was criticised by Toner (2003) as naively assuming unions were the only potential source of cost differences. Other structural factors could also explain them, including greater on-site complexity (it costs more to affix a plasterboard wall on the tenth floor of a high rise than on a ground floor cottage), higher capital intensity and higher profit margins in the commercial sector. Econtech countered that if the gap declined then it would reflect not structural explanations but changes in work practices associated with the activities with non-union individual contracting showed no advantage for individual contracting (Gilson and Wagar 1997; Fry, Jarvis and Loundes 2002; Hull and Read 2003; Peetz 2005) .
There is one consistent positive relationship that comes through in the literature: 'what matters is not unionism per se but the interaction of unions with management' (Freeman 2005:657) , as 'union plants with cooperative labor relations and high-performance HRM practices have above-average productivity, whereas union plants with adversarial relations and traditional "job control" HRM practices have below-average productivity' (Kaufman 2005 citing Hirsch 2004 . Black and Lynch (2001) showed that amongst workplaces promoting joint decision making and incentive-based pay, unionised workplaces had higher productivity than non-union workplaces, whereas amongst workplaces without any innovations, the reverse was the case. In Australia, the intensity of collaboration between management and workers (via unions) has a positive effect on workplace performance (Alexander and Green 1992).
The release of the 2007 report
Econtech was an economic consultancy based in Canberra.
1 It most visibly entered the debate on industrial relations reform in July 2007 (Econtech 2007b ) when it produced a report for major employers, that was used in advertising, even before it was released In addition, 'the higher construction productivity leads to an increase in consumer living standards (the annual economic welfare gain) of about $3.1 billion' (Econtech 2007a, p46) .
A month later, the methodology was critiqued by Mitchell (2007) . He argued Econtech 'provides no transparency in their published work and replication of their results is impossible'. Using ABS implicit price deflator data he found non-residential construction prices grew at a slightly slower rate than residential and non-residential building and 'found no evidence to support the hypothesis that a sudden 'event'…has altered the time series behaviour of the…data.' (Mitchell 2007 
Problems with the 2007 Report
In an attempt to verify the Econtech report, we went back to the original source data of Rawlinson's. We obtained data for January in the years 1993, 1995, 2001, 2002 and 2004 to 2008. We replicated the stated Econtech methodology, obtaining data on the following eight tasks in domestic residential and commercial construction: reinforced concrete 25 mpa suspended slab ne 150mm thick; class 3 formwork sofit of suspended slab 100/200mm thick;
clay brickwork wall or skin of hollow wall 110mm thick; carpentry wall framing plates 75 x 38mm; doors, timber, hollow core, std 2040 x 820 x35 hardboard for painting; steel roofing corrugated, zinc coated 0.42mm; plasterboard flush finished, 10mm thick to timber wall framing; and painting, woodwork, acrylic, primer, one undercoat, two gloss coats.
We identified the ratio of commercial to domestic costs for each item for each year in each mainland capital city (Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide). There are, it appears, what Econtech describe as 'slight differences in the precise definitions' of tasks used by us and Econtech, but Econtech advise that these differences 'are not material' and led to a discrepancy of merely 0.1% in estimates of movements in the cost differential in 2008 (email communication, 31/10/08). So, for all practical purposes, we used the same data as Econtech.
We calculated an average cost differential for each capital, and a national weighted average which used the weights Econtech provided, based on each state's 'average contribution to national contribution activity'.
For 2006, we detected a fall of just 1.5 points, barely half the 2.9 point fall claimed by Econtech and, again, within a fairly normal range. So, over the period January 2005-January 2007, the actual fall in the cost differential was not 12.6 percentage points, but 2.8 points.
Notably, the cost differential in 2007 was still 11.7%. This was actually slightly higher than the gap of 10.8% in January 2002, before even the establishment of the Building Industry Task Force. In fact, the cost differential was higher in 2007 than in each of the early years for which we had collected data. Econtech has reviewed its previous use of the Rawlinsons data to remove anomalies.
For the original 2007 Econtech Report, some data was inadvertently juxtaposed in manually extracting it from Rawlinson's annual hard copy publications. The use of all Rawlinsons data has been carefully checked and is now correct (Econtech 2008, p8) . ). This change of 3.3% was then roughly doubled, on the intriguing assumption that the only possible source of these alleged gains is labour costs, which make up just 53% of total costs for the tasks. The base year selected produces the best result: the very poor performance during the period of the BCII Act is ignored, and data from prior to 2004 are suppressed, avoiding disclosure of the fact that the cost differential was not significantly less than it had been five or ten years earlier.
Long term patterns and the productivity crystal ball
With the discrediting of the earlier cost comparisons, the main basis for continued boasting of productivity improvements were some 'case studies', a comparison between actual and predicted productivity in the construction industry and a chart using Productivity Commission data on multi-factor productivity. The 'case studies' (which were identical in the No. 5204.0 ). If there has been a 9.4 per cent increase in productivity attributable to the BCII Act, it should be clearly evident in the ABS data, which should show construction industry productivity growth well above that in other industries. 
Conclusion
The exercise by an Australian state agency of coercive powers against construction industry workers has been justified by reference to claimed gains in productivity and hence national welfare. We have examined the data behind the productivity claims and found that they were erroneous, probably due to incorrect transcription, and that the source data indicated no relative productivity gains. The boost to GDP, savings to the CPI and national welfare gains in each of the Econtech reports, estimated as they were 'from the recent closing of the cost gap between commercial building and domestic housing', had no basis as there was no 'closing of the cost gap'. Despite being made aware of this, the ABCC and its consultant, Econtech, stuck to the original claims about the size of productivity and welfare gains from the use of coercive powers. The errors ('anomalies') in the 2007 report might be dismissed as an 'honest mistake', but can the later insistence on not revising findings be so easily dismissed? Claimed productivity gains from the use of coercive powers are also not discernible in official ABS or Productivity Commission data. The critiques of Toner (2003) and Mitchell (2007) stand. The literature suggests that the unionised building and construction industry would benefit from more cooperative union-management relations.
The role of the ABCC has been to penalise cooperative relations, and so it might come as no surprise that previous policy makers' productivity expectations have not been met. However, there is some evidence that there has been a shift of income shares in the industry from labour to capital, with coercive powers reducing strikes and labour's bargaining power.
We also draw attention to weaknesses in public debate over these issues. Little critical thought was given in the media to the Econtech reports on the building and construction industry, even though its similarly timed report on industrial relations reform policies was received with considerable scepticism. While some union officials in the industry have clearly harmed their own cause, the responsibility also lies with the media, with commentators and with policy makers to examine the evidence put before them and assess it on its merits. Attaching numbers to something does not make it true. The Econtech experience should be illustrative of a wider lesson for the media and commentators: to treat with extreme scepticism commissioned 'modelling' or like reports prepared by commercial consultancy firms for interest groups, especially when the findings advance that group's political interests. There is good reason for the adage, 'he who pays the piper, calls the tune'.
the nature of regulation in the building and construction industry. The alleged economic benefits have been used to justify the denial of basic rights to employees in the industry, rights which everybody else is, at least at present, entitled to enjoy. In short, there do not appear to be any significant economic benefits that warrant the loss of rights involved in coercive arrangements. A more cooperative, less punitive approach by policy makers to the industry would not only be consistent with better human rights, it might even be consistent with better productivity.
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